Etisalat by e& UAE and Cyberint Join Forces to Strengthen Cyber Security


First observed in 2019 and advertised (Figure 1) as a ‘Malware-as-a-Service’ (MaaS) threat on various cybercriminal forums, Raccoon is an information stealer targeting victim credentials and cryptocurrency wallets.

Raccoon Stealer_0

Figure 1 – Raccoon Stealer forum banner

Seemingly favored by some threat actors due to its simplicity, the malware element of Raccoon omits advanced features, such as those used to evade detection, and instead focuses on the ‘stealer’ task in hand.

Whilst this approach requires those deploying the threat to utilize third-party tools for evasion, such as cryptors or packers to thwart signature-based detection, the ongoing popularity and apparent success of Raccoon suggests that this has not been a problem for many.

Lacking their own distribution method, recently observed Raccoon incidents appear to begin with the delivery of malicious document attachments sent via an indiscriminate unsolicited email (malspam) campaign. It is also reported that Raccoon malware has been dropped using third-party exploit kits and other malware families.

Additionally, Raccoon samples have been seen to mimic other executables although, based on their filenames, these have likely been distributed via sites hosting copyright-infringing materials which, in themselves, should be considered high-risk and be avoided.

Further leading to Raccoon’s continued prevalence and success, those behind this MaaS offering are lauded for their high levels of service, and their management dashboard, much like the malware element, is reportedly straightforward and easy to use.

Raccoon is advertised on various cybercriminal forums with subscriptions available for $499 (US) for four months, $200 for one month and $75 for a ‘trial’ week. The minimal outlay combined with a positive reputation likely appeals to many less sophisticated threat actors, especially given the potential return on investment (ROI) following the resale or abuse of stolen credentials and cryptocurrency wallets.

Notably, based on the analysis of recent samples and a change log hosted on the threat actor’s Telegram channel, the most recent release of Raccoon Stealer is version 1.7.3 and introduced support for additional cryptocurrency wallets, including those installed as browser plugins, as well as improved control panel statistics and various back-end improvements to the command and control (C2) gate server infrastructure.

Raccoon Stealer Control Panel

Hosted on a Tor onion service, Raccoon subscribers have access to a centralized control panel from which they can generate and/or manage campaign configurations, build Raccoon malware payloads, and view data stolen from victims.

Displayed in English by default, although also available in Russian, visitors to the control panel are prompted to log in using the username and password (Figure 2) they presumably received when subscribing.

Raccoon Stealer_1

Figure 2 – Dashboard login

Visitors can also view the Support page, without authentication, that provides both Jabber and Telegram contact details for those who are behind this MaaS threat (Figure 3).

Raccoon Stealer_2-1

Figure 3 – Support contacts

Given the inability to purchase access through this official control panel, threat actors seeking access would presumably need to initiate contact with the Raccoon team, via their forum posts or using the contact details above to ‘subscribe’.

Although access to this control panel requires an active Raccoon subscription and credentials, screenshots previously shared by the threat actor provide an insight into its interface and functionality based on the available menu options (Figure 4)

Raccoon Stealer_3

Figure 4 – Menu options

Notably, the control panel makes use of JavaScript resources (Figure 5) that can be accessed without authentication and allows some of the current functionality to be determined, including features that would likely require administrative access.

Raccoon Stealer_4-1

Figure 5 – Control panel HTML including the ‘revealing’ JavaScript resource

In addition to this, the JavaScript exposes text related to the user agreement and FAQ sections, both of which are provided within the appendices for reference.

Administrative Options

Based on an analysis of the exposed JavaScript resource, the following additional menu options appear to be available to Raccoon’s administrators:

  • All logs
  • All statistics
  • News
  • Proxies
  • Users

Potentially leaving a subscriber unaware of their malware deployment’s success, code references related to the ‘All logs’ and ‘All statistics’ options appear to provide Raccoon administrators with the ability to access and/or delete data processed by the platform.

Theoretically allowing administrators to have their pick of any victim data, it would likely be naive to think that this would not be the case and may therefore be one cost of doing business with other cybercriminals, especially given the adage that there is no honor amongst thieves.

Commonly used for anonymization, even though the intent is not obvious from the JavaScript (Figure 6) and may be related to their gate infrastructure, the ‘Proxy’ option enables Raccoon administrators to add, remove and test proxies, including running checks against ‘VT’ (presumably VirusTotal) as well as assigning them to and from users.

Raccoon Stealer_5

Figure 6 – Proxy functionality available to control panel administrators

Given that the Raccoon malware component does not appear to upload stolen data directly to this Tor onion site, it is possible that the proxy configuration is used to mask the exfiltration process to intermediate infrastructure, although, without further analysis, this is currently speculation.

Finally, the remaining administrative options are likely more self-explanatory with the ‘News’ option facilitating the creation of news articles or notifications and the ‘Users’ option providing subscriber management.


Likely displayed upon login and the default page for a subscriber visiting the control panel, the Statistics panel provides an at-a-glance overview of active campaigns (Figure 7).

Raccoon Stealer_6-1

Figure 7 – Management control panel ‘Statistics’ and ‘Account’

Additionally, the Account section displays the current Main and Bonus balances, likely related to subscription funds, alongside options that allow the control panel interface to be switched between light and dark modes, the configuration of two-factor authentication, and a password reset function.

Notably, the ‘Check wallets’ option visible in the screenshot does not appear to be referenced by the current JavaScript resource and may have been removed. Whilst vague, this option may have provided the ability to determine the value of stolen cryptocurrency wallets, such as via public blockchain services, although with an increase in targeted currencies it may no longer be relevant.


Seemingly enhanced since Raccoon’s initial release, victim data presented within a legacy screenshot (Figure 8) is consistent with the malware’s current capabilities but lacks additional columns identified from an analysis of the currently deployed JavaScript resource.

Raccoon Stealer_7-1

Figure 8 – Management control panel ‘Logs’

Based on the current control panel, it appears that the ‘Logs’ table now shows the following headers:

  • GEO – Country code based on victim IP address geolocation.
  • IP – Victim IP address.
  • USR – Implies ‘username’ but may be another unique victim identifier (references ‘bot_id’).
  • UTC – Victim system time.
  • UA – Victim browser user-agent strings.
  • PWD – Number of acquired victim passwords.
  • CKE – Number of acquired victim cookies.
  • CC – Number of acquired victim credit card details.
  • WLT – Number of acquired victim cryptocurrency wallets.
  • TAG – Likely a user-customizable tag feature.
  • DAT – Potentially identifies date/time the data was acquired (references ‘create_data_unix’).
  • USR – Seemingly duplicated header displaying the victim’s username.
  • COM – Customizable comment field.
  • GET – Displays the exfiltrated file size and allows the Zip archive to be downloaded.
  • ACT – Additional ‘actions’ including the ability to delete the stolen data.

A comprehensive search capability is also provided within the Logs section (Figure 9) that, given the presence of an elasticsearch_id string within the JavaScript, may indicate that the control panel is using Elasticsearch to store stolen data.

Raccoon Stealer_8

Figure 9 – Log search capability


Undoubtedly used to configure and create Windows executables that contain the Raccoon stealer payload, the JavaScript resource provides an indication of the functionality present in the Builds and Configs sections of the control panel.

Based on the FAQ, subscribers have the ability to generate a single build, although multiple configurations are supported as these can be updated and downloaded from the C2 infrastructure mid-campaign. In addition to preventing subscriber abuse, such as account sharing or usage after license expiration, this eliminates the need for subscribers to rebuild their payload after making subtle configuration changes.

Having assigned a name to their configuration, the following options can be set:

  • Screenshots – Disabled by default; takes a screenshot of the victim desktop.
  • Browser history – Disabled by default; gathers 1,000 lines of recent web-browser history.
  • Self removal – Automatically removes Raccoon stealer after data exfiltration.
  • File loader URLs – Download and execute additional payloads on the victim host after data exfiltration.

Additionally, ‘file grabber rules’ can be configured to allow collection and exfiltration of files from victim hosts based on the following conditions:

  • Path – Starting directory on the victim host from which to start the ‘file grabber’; for example: C:\.
  • Mask – Comma-delimited list of filename masks including wildcards; for example: *.doc,*.xls.
  • Size Limit – Maximum size per file (up-to 100mb), in kilobytes; for example 150kb would be: 150.
  • Exceptions – Directories, within the specified path, to excluded from searches, for example: \Windows\.
  • Subfolders – Presumably enabling or disabling searches within subdirectories.
  • Shortcuts – Collect matching files referenced by shortcuts; for example, file.doc.lnk would download the corresponding file.doc.

After defining and selecting a configuration, the build process allows the creation of either a dynamic link library (DLL) or executable (EXE) that would enable the threat actor to deliver and launch the payload using their preferred method.

As a somewhat professional touch, and likely contributing toward the positive opinion of Raccoon, a test feature allows this newly built payload to be tested in a virtual machine maintained by the Raccoon team. Presumably used to check that the payload successfully executes and communicates with the C2 infrastructure, the conclusion of this test reportedly results in a notification being sent to the subscriber via the control panel.

Consistent with many other Russian-language cybercriminal threats, attention is drawn to the fact that Raccoon stealer will not function on victim hosts that are determined as being within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) based on their system locale (language) or IP address. Subscribers are also reminded to ‘crypt’ their builds to evade detection and to ‘keep in mind’ that long-term use could increase the chances of detection (Figure 10).

Raccoon Stealer_9-1

Figure 10 – Build/Config warnings

Raccoon Stealer Payload

Having tested and secured their payload, the threat actor will need to deliver Raccoon to would-be victims.

Based on observations of recent activity, many appear to favor using malicious document attachments sent via unsolicited email (malspam) campaigns, potentially linked to the use of third-party exploit kits or other malware families, as well as Raccoon payloads being uploaded to file-sharing sites, such as those hosting copyright-infringing materials, and/or mimicking other executables.

Command & Control

Based on the intelligence gathered from the Raccoon Stealer control panel, each payload will attempt to communicate with some seemingly benign or legitimate URL from which an encrypted string is gathered and processed to obtain the true command and control (C2) URL, typically comprised of an IP address and potentially a /gate/log.php resource.

As detailed in a February 2020 analysis by Cyberark [1], Raccoon previously hid this C2 server address in an encrypted string that posed as a filename hosted on Google Drive, even though this is seemingly no longer the case.

Based on analysis of recent payloads, Raccoon currently communicates with websites offering Telegram URL shortening services. Upon access, the profile overview of a threat actor-controlled Telegram user is displayed (Figure 11) with the ‘description’ field containing an encrypted C2 string.

Raccoon Stealer_10-1

Figure 11 – Example Telegram user details

Parsing this HTML response, Raccoon locates the encrypted C2 URL by locating the preceding string description" dir="auto"> (Figure 12).

Raccoon Stealer_11-1

Figure 12 – Telegram user details HTML (Yellow: element search; Red: encoded string)

While this feature allows the C2 servers to be easily updated, the use of third-party Telegram URL shortening services rather than the legitimate service (https://t[.]me/<GROUP|USER>) allows defenders to detect and block anomalous behavior, especially given the low-reputation domains that these are hosted on.

Having decrypted and decoded the encrypted C2 URL, using its own XOR cipher routines, Raccoon calls home via a HTTP POST containing three parameters hidden in a base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted string (Figure 13):

  • b= – Bot identifier, comprised of the victim ‘machine GUID’, as found in the Windows registry, an underscore and the victim username.
  • c= – Configuration identifier, a hexadecimal string or hash that refers to a specific threat actor’s configuration.
  • f= – Configuration file format, only observed as being set to ‘JSON’.

Raccoon Stealer_12-1

Figure 13 – Example C2 HTTP POST

In response, the C2 server sends a JSON configuration, also base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted with the same passphrase, containing the following values (Figure 14):

  • _id – Identifier, potentially related to the threat actor or some combination of victim and/or configuration.
  • au – Previously known as attachment_url, specifies the C2 path containing supporting files used by the Raccoon payload such as sqlite3.dll.
  • ls – Previously known as libraries, supporting files for the Raccoon payload.
  • ip – Victim IP address.
  • location – Victim IP geolocation, contains country, country_code, state, state_code, city, zip, latitude and longitude.
  • c – Previously known as the config section, contains:
    • m – Previously known as masks, specifies any file search masks used for data theft.
    • lu – Previously known as loader_urls, specifies any additional payloads to be downloaded and executed after the conclusion of Raccoon’s data exfiltration.
  • lu – Seemingly a second loader_urls value.
  • rm – Disables (0) or enables (1) the self-removal feature.
  • is_screen_enabled – Disables (0) or enables (1) the screenshot feature.
  • is_history_enabled – Disables (0) or enables (1) the browser history acquisition feature.
  • depth – Undetermined, potentially a path depth used to limit the file search mask feature.

Raccoon Stealer_13-1

Figure 14 – Example C2 response

Data Theft

Raccoon stealer can extract credentials, cookies and payment card data from a number of applications including the following as identified from recently analyzed samples:

  • Browsers: Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera and those that are Chromium-based including Microsoft Edge.
  • Cryptocurrency Wallets: Electron Cash, Electrum-LTC, Ethereum, Exodus, Guarda, Jaxx Liberty, MetaMask and MyMonero

Notably, to gather other cryptocurrency wallets, Raccoon also searches for the commonly used filename wallet.dat.

Utilizing dynamic link libraries (DLL) downloaded from C2 paths specified in the JSON configuration and saved to %USERPROFILE%\AppData\LocalLow\, supporting files allow access to data stored by the targeted applications. For example, recent campaigns have been observed as deploying the legitimate SQLite file sqlite3.dll allowing access to browser data stored within SQLite databases.

In addition to data theft, Raccoon gathers system information that is saved in a file named machineinfo.txt and includes details of the build version, operating system, hardware and installed applications (Figure 15).

Raccoon Stealer_14-1

Figure 15 – Example machineinfo.txt file

Having completed both the data theft and information gathering stages, Raccoon generates an exfiltration Zip archive in %USERPROFILE%\AppData\LocalLow\ using the configuration _id value followed by .zip as the filename rather than as previously.

Once prepared, this archive is uploaded to a C2 gate server, notably without encryption, via a HTTP POST.

Presumably confirming the upload, the server responds with a forty-character hexadecimal string, potentially some SHA1 hash or checksum, before allowing Raccoon to act on any final configuration such as self-removal or the download and execution of additional payloads.

Additional Payloads

Given the file loader capability provided by Raccoon, it is possible for a threat actor to initiate the download and execution of additional payloads once the stealer has completed its data exfiltration.

While these payloads will undoubtedly change depending on each threat actor’s requirements, recent observations include the deployment of additional malware, such as those used to gain and maintain remote access, as well as crypto-jacking payloads that abuse a compromised host’s computational power to mine cryptocurrencies including ‘Ether’.

In the latter case, crypto-jacking payloads typically join a shared pool and will likely generate significant cryptocurrency incomes for the threat actor given enough victims.

Furthermore, those behind Raccoon announced the beta release of a module on April 23, 2021 (Figure 16) named Raccoon Clipper that currently targets Bitcoin (BTC), Dogecoin (DOGE), Ethereum (ETH), Litecoin (LTC) and Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency wallets.

Raccoon Stealer_15

Figure 16 – ‘Raccoon Clipper’ forum announcement

Based on a promotional video released alongside this announcement (Figure 17), this module allows legitimate payment addresses within cryptocurrency applications to be replaced surreptitiously resulting in victims inadvertently making payments to a cryptocurrency address belonging to the threat actor.

Raccoon Stealer_16

Figure 17 – Promotional video (Left: Legitimate address removed; Right: Threat Actor address inserted)

While this module was not observed in the recently analyzed samples, it is available to subscribers for only an $50 and will therefore likely gain traction in the coming months.


  • Employee security awareness training remains an important step in helping them identify and be suspicious of unsolicited emails and phishing campaigns, especially messages with embedded links or file attachments that could lead to the deployment of additional malicious payloads.
  • Multi-factor authentication should be implemented wherever possible to limit the effectiveness of any stolen credentials.
  • Employees should be reminded of the risks associated with credential reuse and weak passwords supported by password policies to encourage best practice.
  • Ensure that email security controls are applied to limit the delivery of potentially malicious attachments or links to end-users, as well as implementing protocols and security controls such as DKIM, DMARC and SPF.
  • Continuous monitoring of unusual endpoint behaviors such as requests to low reputation domains, can provide an early indication of compromise.
  • Those using cryptocurrencies should consider the use of hardware-based wallets and ensure that payment addresses are verified before submitting a transaction.

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256 Hashes

The following samples were observed in May 2021 and may be beneficial for those seeking to further understand the nature of this threat:

  • 012e382049b88808e2d0b26e016dc189f608deea9b6cc993ce24a57c99dd93d1
  • 18c27b85f26566dd782171e00ea5b5872546b23526cca0ebb185caca35fdec93
  • 24499fbfd8a2b2663899841f3cf424b60d60c26351b5d491fd475adf9e301256
  • 3c5120a6e894b64924dc44f3cdc0da65f277b32870f73019cefeacf492663c0e
  • 40175d0027919244b6b56fe5276c44aba846d532501e562da37831403c9ed44e
  • 624b7ae8befcf91dbf768d9703147ac8f9bd46b08ffe14a75c77e88736bf07d0
  • 75c3a83073d9b15d4f47308b5d688f1ec07422419e3bd54e78f6ef8683d42e5c
  • 8815b21c44c22aec31f7fa6e69dcb83a60c572f8365ff02b5c6f12154e01a4c2
  • 97e95e99fd499ec45a7c1d8683d5731ce5e7a8fb8b710622e578cd169a00d8d9
  • a2420c7f0c7bf5d3c0893aff6b7440a09c0531632434d2bbb6f8ed98b04317b9
  • bfb37c9adc809e880f56dd10898b5425242330d6e2fa69e014a98e6dc18ce416
  • caf3eca514de58e215b5e9f568f748293be64a3c82e15c2f905903cd9bfacc1c
  • de7ccff53ca27db1ed1e3e0d0df07f2e3364ec6b7e60622dc7726cba56831eb7


  • telete[.]in – Initial ‘call home’ to an unofficial Telegram service
  • telecut[.]in – Suspicious domain related to telete[.]in
  • tgraph[.]io – Suspicious domain related to telete[.]in
  • tttttt[.]me – Initial ‘call home’ to an unofficial Telegram service
  • telegram[.]cat – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • telegram[.]services – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • tlgr[.]org – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • xn--r1a[.]click (т[.]click) – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • xn--r1a[.]link (т[.]link) – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • xn--r1a[.]live(т[.]live) – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • xn--r1a[.]site (т[.]site) – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me
  • xn--r1a[.]website (т[.]website) – Suspicious domain related to tttttt[.]me

IP Addresses

  • 195.201.225[.]248 – Resolves to telete[.]in and related domains
  • 95.216.186[.]40 – Resolves to tttttt[.]me and related domains


  • hxxps://telete[.]in/jiocacossa
  • hxxps://tttttt[.]me/kokajakprozak
  • hxxps://tttttt[.]me/antitantief3
  • hxxps://telete[.]in/baudemars
  • hxxps://telete[.]in/bpa1010100102
  • hxxps://tttttt[.]me/brikitiki
  • hxxps://tttttt[.]me/ch0koalpengold

    Contact us to learn more about how threat intelligence can protect your business.

Appendix A – Raccoon Stealer ‘User Agreement’

Extracted from the currently deployed Raccoon Stealer control panel, the following text is presented as the ‘User Agreement’ that subscribers must accept.

User agreement

By paying (by becoming a customer) Raccoon Stealer (hereinafter referred to as the service) you agree to the conditions described below.

This user agreement is final and non-negotiable.

Our service does not work and will never be in the CIS. Discussion of this in the chat will be punishable by ban.

We are only responsible for the correct operation of our service. No third-party services apply to this.

We are not responsible for the ratio, because a huge number of elements are involved in the process of log extraction. But we always want our customers to be satisfied. Just contact one of the support and we will try to solve your problem.

We are not responsible for logs stored in our panel for more than 2 months. Logs of inactive clients are deleted 2 days after the end of the subscription. We recommend that you always download your logs to avoid unpleasant situations.

Appendix B – Raccoon Stealer FAQ

Extracted from the currently deployed control panel, the following text is presented as a frequently asked questions (FAQ) page for subscribers.

Q0. How long do you store logs if my account is inactive?
A0. We are not responsible for logs stored in our panel for more than 2 months. Logs of inactive clients are deleted 2 days after the end of the subscription. We recommend that you always download your logs to avoid unpleasant situations

Q1. Where can I find info about my account and set it up?
A1. Click on your nick on the sidebar. This is your profile. You can see your install statistics there. Also license time, balance (temporary n/a), theme setting, 2FA, etc.

Q2. How can I protect my account?
A2. You can change your password in your profile settings. Also you can set up 2FA for your account.

Q3. How do I know about your product updates?
A3. Click on News button on the sidebar. If you haven't read messages yet, you will see red circle sign. Important news and updated apper as banner on the top of any page.

Q4. How to test and download my build?
A4: Click on Build button on the sidebar. Click on the Add Build button on the top of the menu. Your build will appear on the bottom. Please read the sign in the orange box. Push the "Test" button. After that you must receive notification on the top of the page. And test log must appear in "Logs" menu. Test emulate full build work on our VM. If you receiving an error please contact our support team.

Q5. In what file formats is your build available?
A5. In *.EXE and *.DLL

Q6. Does your build work at Low Integrity Level?
A6. Yes!

Q7. Must I crypt your build?
A7. It's necessary. By using clean build you increase AV detects quantity. It will affect your results and results of each user of our service, especially your account. Users who check build on Virus Total and similar sites are blocked without money back.

Q8. Why must I test the build?
A8. We always ask our users to make these steps:
    1) Test with 'test button' in panel
    2) Test on virtual or real Windows machine
    3) Check log archive from Windows machine if everything is stealed fine

Q9. Should I generate new build after gate change, update, etc.?
A9. No! This is our difference from other info-stealing software. You can keep working with same build and it will be active. Of course, exceptions are possible with global updates. In such cases we notify our users in News tabs and in clients chat.

Q10. Why can I generate only one build?
A10. This was made to avoid speculation and use of the account by several people. We are planning to add multi-build function in the future for additional price.

Q11. How to create and use configs?
A11: On the top of the "Builds" you can see "Add config" button. You must add config name. After that you can choose and apply it in drop-down list on your build. You can turn on screenshots function and history grabbing, they are turned off by defauilt. Also you can add loader urls, set them up with some required links and  prepare file grabber settings.

Q12. Must I generate new build after config change?
A12. No. Raccoon loads configuration from the server. You can edit your config on the go with no rebuild required.

Q13. Does Raccoon work on CIS PC's?
A13. No for all. If you run Raccoon of PC with CIS language or IP, it will stop working. Don't be surprised with such behavior.
     No! And don't even ask about it. Also notice if you will run our file on RU or CIS machine nothing will happen. This is normal. Our soft doesn't work in this countries.

Q14. How can I save my search parameters?
A14: Just fill "Mask name" box and make a search. Button with your search template will appear on the top of your log table. This options very useful and help increase speed of your daily routine work.

Q15. What do logs statuses mean?
A15: "NEW" - new log which has not been opened or downloaded yet.
     "OPEN" - log which one was opened or downloaded (or you viewed passwords/links/cookies).
     "DOUBLE" - someone in the panel has the same log. So it may mean your traffic was sold to many hands. 
     "TEST" - test log from our virtual machine. - Deprecated
     "VM" - log from VM (this function in demo mode now). - Deprecated

Q16. I'm receiving so many EMPTY logs. Why?
A16: 1. Stealer knocks to the gate on the start of his work. 
     2. "EMPTY" log will appear in your panel. 
     3. Soft collects data and sends archive to the gate. 
     4. Panel parse data from log and give log status "NEW".
     If after some time status has not changed, Raccoon died in the battle with antivirus. Or upload speed on the machine is too slow. If you are receiving many "EMPTY"  logs you should check quality of your crypt / traffic.

Q17. Can you share contacts of crypt, traffic or install guys?
A17. We are working on support and updates only. We can not guarantee successful work of people who sell certain services. Please ask for advice in chat and don't forget to use escrow service of our Telegram chat!

Q18. I have a logs store and I need CSV table for it.
A18: On the top of the logs tab you can see "CSV" button. Feel free to use it.

Q19. I can't download all logs at once, what should I do?
A19. In case of high load, the multi-download process may fail. Please download less then 2000 logs per multi-download. If you have any problems downloading logs, feel free to contact our support and they will restart the process.

Q20. What if I have issues with particular log?
A20: Place your mouse arrow on the date of log, you "Bot ID" of this log. Send this information to one of our support and we'll do our best to fix the problem.

Q21. How do you monitor the status of your system?
A21. We have set up alarm system for all important nodes. We track AV detects and health of our gates and make decisions based on this info. Everything for least downtime! You will be notified about planned downtime.

Q22. What influences my ratio?
A22. There are a lot of factors that affect ratio. From crypt to methods of spreading your malware. Also your config may affect amount of AV detects in runtime. You should consult with admins if you are not sure that your config is set up fine.

Q23. What maximum file size can Raccoon grab?
A23. 100 Mb

Q24. Can I host your panel on my server?
A24. No for all.

Q25. What will happen with my logs if my license time is over?
A25. We are not responsible for logs stored in our panel for more than 2 months. Logs of inactive clients are deleted 2 days after the end of the subscription. We recommend that you always download your logs to avoid unpleasant situations.

Q26. Can I load multiple files with your loader option?
A26. Yes you can.

Q27. Where can I leave my wishes about work of your soft and panel?
A27. Please contact our support. We also give constant consideration to our customers' ideas.

Q28. I am receiving API Error.
A28. This is happen due to that back-end and front-end hosts on separate servers and your node doesn't receive or response to the request. Please restart Tor browser and try again. If you are still facing the problem, please contact support.



Uncover your compromised credentials from the deep and dark web

Fill in your business email to start